Are we really measuring empathy? Proposal for a new measurement framework by Coll, M-P et al.
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: EMPATHY NEW FRAMEWORK 1 
 
Are we Really Measuring 
Empathy? Proposal for a New 
Measurement Framework. 
  
Michel-Pierre Coll1,2,*, Essi Viding3, Markus Rütgen4, Giorgia Silani5, 
Claus Lamm4, Caroline Catmur6 and Geoffrey Bird1,2 
 
1 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford 
OX1 3UD, UK.  
 
2 MRC Social, Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London, University of London, SE5 8AF, UK.  
 
3 Developmental Risk and Resilience Unit, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, 
University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK.  
 
4 Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Unit, Department of Basic Psychological 
Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna 1010, 
Austria.  
 
5 Department of Applied Psychology: Health, Development, Enhancement and Intervention, 
University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Vienna 1010, Austria.  
 
6 Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s 
College, London, London, SE5 8AF, UK.  
 
*Correspondence to: michel-pierre.coll@psy.ox.ac.uk 
  
 
 
EMPATHY NEW FRAMEWORK 2 
 
 
Abstract 1 
 Empathy - currently defined as the sharing of another’s affective state - has been the 2 
focus of much psychological and neuroscientific research in the last decade, much of which has 3 
been focused on ascertaining the empathic ability of individuals with various clinical conditions. 4 
However, most of this work tends to overlook the fact that empathy is the result of a complex 5 
process requiring a number of intermediate processing steps. It is therefore the case that 6 
describing an individual or group as ‘lacking empathy’ lacks specificity. We argue for an 7 
alternative measurement framework, in which we explain variance in empathic response in terms 8 
of individual differences in the ability to identify another’s emotional state (‘emotion 9 
identification’), and the degree to which identification of another’s state causes a corresponding 10 
state in the self (‘affect sharing’). We describe how existing empathy paradigms need to be 11 
modified in order to fit within this measurement framework, and illustrate the utility of this 12 
approach with reference to examples from both cognitive neuroscience and clinical psychology. 13 
  Keywords: Empathy; affect sharing; emotion identification; neuroscience; model; 14 
theory; definition. 15 
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Highlights 22 
 23 
  24 
    • Empathy is currently defined as sharing the state of another.  25 
    • This definition conflates the identification and the sharing of another's state.  26 
    • Describing change or impairment in empathy therefore lacks specificity.  27 
    • We show how this can be problematic for popular paradigms in social neuroscience.  28 
    • And propose an alternative measurement framework to resolve this issue  29 
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1  Introduction 30 
Empathy is commonly understood to be a complex psychological construct that plays a 31 
crucial role in social interaction. As with many complex constructs, several overlapping but 32 
distinct definitions of empathy have been suggested (Batson, 2009; Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 33 
2016). While there is as yet no consensus as to the precise definition of empathy, most 34 
researchers (at least in the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychology) agree that empathy 35 
involves the adoption of another’s affective state so that both the Empathizer and the empathic 36 
target (henceforth ‘Target’) are in a similar state (Cuff et al., 2016; Decety & Jackson, 2004; de 37 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006;  de Waal, 2008; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz 38 
& Perry, 2009). This notion of sharing the affective state of another forms the core of what we 39 
shall refer to as the standard definition of empathy. 40 
Empathy has received considerable research attention in the last decade, with a particular 41 
focus on its neural instantiation permitted by improvements in human functional neuroimaging 42 
(Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Zaki & Ochsner, 43 
2012). Establishing the neural networks underlying empathy can elucidate the relationship 44 
between self- and other-related affective experiences, provide information about the functional 45 
processes involved in empathy, and suggest interventions to modulate levels of empathy 46 
wherever desired.  47 
Despite several leading theoretical models arguing for a multi-factorial structure of 48 
empathy (Davis, 1980; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002), 49 
there have been surprisingly few efforts to develop exhaustive information processing models to 50 
detail the different processing stages involved in producing an empathic response. One 51 
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consequence of this is that it becomes difficult to determine the locus of any effect that 52 
influences the empathic response. Without consideration of the contribution of those processes 53 
upon which empathy relies, one cannot be sure that any effect is on empathy per se, or on a 54 
computational precursor. Here, it will be argued that empathy relies upon, but is distinct from, 55 
the ability to identify the emotional state of the Target (Bird & Viding, 2014; Happé, Cook, & Bird, 56 
2017). The implication of this distinction between empathy and emotion identification for past 57 
and future research will be discussed by showing that failing to distinguish these two constructs 58 
could interfere with the correct interpretation and measurement of differences in empathic 59 
responses associated with experimental manipulations or clinical conditions. Distinguishing 60 
between emotion identification and empathy necessarily requires refinement of at least the 61 
standard measurement framework for empathy, and possibly the definition of empathy itself. 62 
 63 
2  Current issues with the measurement of empathy 64 
 Under the standard definition, for empathy to have occurred, the Empathizer must be in 65 
a similar affective state to the Target. It therefore necessarily follows that in order to 66 
demonstrate an empathic response, the Empathizer must be able to identify the Target’s 67 
affective state accurately, and identification of the Target’s state must cause the Empathizer to 68 
share this state. Under the standard definition of empathy therefore, the Empathizer can only be 69 
considered empathic if they correctly identify and share the Target’s emotion. Conversely, in 70 
cases where the Empathizer does not identify the Target’s state accurately, irrespective of 71 
whether the Empathizer shares the state they judge the Target to be in, they cannot fulfil the 72 
standard definition of empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014).  73 
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Under the standard definition then, empathy is a state one enters into as a consequence 74 
of at least two processes (emotion identification and affect sharing): and empathy is just one 75 
possible outcome of these two processes (for example, any inaccuracy of emotion identification 76 
will result in a non-matching state). How then, should one conceptualize individual differences in 77 
empathy? If empathy refers to the outcome of two processes, and, if either of these processes is 78 
not functioning perfectly the outcome does not meet the definition of empathy, then what does 79 
it mean to be less empathic? It is true that the affective state which arises as a consequence of 80 
these two processes can be more or less like the state of the other. However, any state deviating 81 
from the matching state does not meet the definition of empathy. Under the standard ‘matching 82 
state’ definition therefore, empathy is binary – it either occurs or does not. This definition is 83 
incompatible with the common understanding of empathy, in which it is acknowledged that there 84 
can be varying degrees of empathy and that individuals or groups can be more or less empathic. 85 
Despite this, we shall continue to use the term empathic response to refer to the outcome of the 86 
emotion identification and affect sharing processes as it is the term most commonly used in the 87 
literature.  88 
As can be seen then, to describe an individual or group as ‘less empathic’ is problematic 89 
when empathy is defined as a state. However, even if this problem is overlooked, the fact that 90 
empathy is the product of two processes means that one can be ‘less empathic’ either because 91 
one has misidentified the Target’s state, or because even though the Target’s state has been 92 
correctly identified, one does not share the Target’s state. This is an unsatisfactory situation as, 93 
according to current usage, the notion of ‘impaired empathy’ conflates two processes: the 94 
identification of the Target’s state, and the sharing of the Target’s state. These processes 95 
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contribute independent variance to the empathic response and can be independently affected 96 
in clinical conditions. Furthermore, it is likely that a clinical group characterized by reduced 97 
empathy due to poor emotion identification will need a different intervention than a group also 98 
characterized by reduced empathy, but where this is due to reduced affect sharing.  99 
It seems that there are two possible solutions to this problem: The first is that we continue 100 
to use the standard definition of empathy as the outcome of two processes but we do not refer 101 
to individual or group differences in empathy; rather we specify whether any individual 102 
differences, experimental manipulations, or clinical conditions impact emotion identification, 103 
affect sharing or both. This solution has the benefit of keeping the standard definition of 104 
empathy, but dissociates the concept of empathy from measurement of the processes giving rise 105 
to the empathic response. The second solution is to redefine empathy such that rather than the 106 
outcome of a process it becomes the process of affect sharing itself; however, it would be 107 
measured not as the degree to which the Empathizer’s state matches that of the Target, but 108 
rather the degree to which the Empathizer’s state matches that identified in the Target (which 109 
may deviate from the Target’s actual state). This solution has the benefit that it becomes 110 
meaningful to discuss individual differences in empathy (because empathy is no longer binary), 111 
and individual differences in empathy are directly related to the measurement of a single process 112 
rather than a conflation of two processes. A drawback of the new definition is that it deviates 113 
both from the long tradition of existing work on empathy using the standard definition, and from 114 
the popular understanding of empathy. While either approach is logically coherent, it should be 115 
noted that the implications for the measurement of empathy that are outlined below are the 116 
same whichever option is chosen. The first solution is relatively easy to implement and the 117 
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section "Implications for paradigms used in basic and clinical studies of empathy" will describe 118 
how this can be done within existing empathy paradigms. The second solution is more radical 119 
and therefore we have not pursued it further here, but note that adoption of this definition may 120 
be worthy of consideration by the field in future. 121 
 122 
3  Defining and measuring emotion identification and affect 123 
sharing 124 
  We consider emotion identification to be the process of attributing an emotion to an 125 
individual (note that this need not be a conscious attribution) which is agnostic as to the method 126 
by which the attribution is made - it can be based on observable perceptual cues, but also 127 
includes identification of an individual's state based on contextual information or inferential 128 
reasoning. As such, it encompasses the stages of emotion perception, recognition and 129 
categorization (see Schirmer & Adolphs, 2017 for a definition of these concepts). The accuracy of 130 
emotion identification is therefore defined as the degree to which the Empathizer’s judgement 131 
of the state of the Target matches the Target’s actual state (Figure 1- top panel). Specific methods 132 
for measuring emotion identification are outlined below, but it is immediately apparent that an 133 
individual may vary in their ability to identify another’s emotion depending on the cues available 134 
to them and on the context the Target is in. For example, an Empathizer with a specific problem 135 
with the recognition of emotional facial expressions may be very inaccurate in identifying the 136 
Target’s state when the Target’s facial expression is the only information the Empathizer has to 137 
make their judgement, but be much more accurate if they know the situation the Target is in and 138 
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have been in a similar situation. The processes contributing to emotion identification will also be 139 
recruited to explain and predict behaviour without necessarily evoking an emotional response, 140 
but here we are interested in their role in producing an empathic response. 141 
Affect sharing describes the process whereby identification of another’s state causes that 142 
state to be instantiated in the self. Individual differences in affect sharing would be described by 143 
differences in the function mapping the state elicited in the Empathizer as a result of their 144 
judgement of the Target’s emotional state (not the Target’s actual state; see Figures 1 [bottom 145 
panel] and 2). For example, if the affect sharing function can be described as a simple ratio (note 146 
that more complicated functions are possible, and even probable - see Figure 2), then an 147 
individual with a ratio of 2:1 (emotion identified in the other : emotion elicited in the self), would 148 
be described as having a greater degree of affect sharing than an individual for whom the ratio is 149 
3:1. This is because, given that they both identify the same state in the Target, the state elicited 150 
in the former individual will be greater than the state elicited in the latter individual. Affect 151 
sharing may be described as more or less accurate on the basis of the degree of correspondence 152 
between the state of the Target identified by the Empathizer and the empathic response elicited 153 
in the Empathizer. A high degree of correspondence indicates a high degree of accuracy, whereas 154 
‘too much’ affect sharing is indicated when the state elicited in the Empathizer by their 155 
judgement of the Target’s state is more extreme than the state attributed to the Target 156 
(described by a ratio of 1:2 using the example above). This ratio describes affect sharing ability 157 
independently of potential differences in emotion identification, such that individuals with a 158 
similar ratio can be deemed to have similar degrees of affect sharing regardless of their ability to 159 
identify another’s emotion. 160 
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Using these conceptualizations of emotion identification and affect sharing, an empathic 161 
response (state) is the product of emotion identification and an individual’s degree of affect 162 
sharing; separate processes that contribute independent variance. For two individuals who have 163 
the same degree of affect sharing, i.e. their empathic response will be identical given that they 164 
identify the same affective state in another, any difference in their empathic response will reflect 165 
differences in their judgement of the Target's emotion (emotion identification). Conversely, for 166 
two individuals equally good at identifying the state of the Target, any difference in the degree 167 
of empathic response elicited will be due to differences in their degree of affect sharing (Figure 168 
3).  169 
The importance of measuring, and distinguishing between, emotion identification and 170 
affect sharing, is illustrated by the following, somewhat artificial, thought experiment. Consider 171 
the case of a parent who sees their child injured and in great pain, and consequently feels a great 172 
deal of empathic pain on their behalf. If the same parent on a different occasion sees the child 173 
suffer a minor misfortune resulting in only temporary and mild pain, and feels an empathic pain 174 
response that is reduced compared to that which they felt on the first occasion, then one would 175 
not infer that the parent had become less empathic (or more formally that their degree of affect 176 
sharing had reduced). One would infer that their degree of affect sharing remained the same and 177 
that their empathic response was appropriate for the degree of pain attributed to their child in 178 
the latter case, even though their empathic response was reduced. On a within-subject level 179 
therefore, one cannot assume that a reduced empathic response observed at a certain time 180 
point, or after a specific manipulation, is an indicator that affect sharing itself has been reduced 181 
unless it can be demonstrated that the empathic response is less than expected given the state 182 
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identified by the Empathizer in the Target.  183 
The same logic holds for between-subjects comparisons. To return to our thought 184 
experiment, let us consider the case of two adults who see a child undergo an innocuous accident 185 
which would cause only mild and temporary distress in the vast majority of children. However, 186 
one of the adults knows that the child suffers from juvenile arthritis and will therefore experience 187 
a large degree of pain. We would not infer that the greater degree of empathic pain experienced 188 
by this adult is a result of them being more empathic (more formally that they had a greater 189 
degree of affect sharing) than the adult who is ignorant of the child’s condition. Rather, we would 190 
explain their greater empathic response with the fact that they have identified a higher degree 191 
of pain in the child.  192 
These thought experiments illustrate that in order to correctly measure an individual’s 193 
degree of affect sharing, one can neither rely solely on the Empathizer’s empathic response, nor 194 
on the accuracy with which they can identify the Target’s affective state, but must instead use 195 
the degree of correspondence between the Empathizer’s empathic response and the 196 
Empathizer’s identification of the Target’s state. Without measurement of both of these factors, 197 
it is impossible to dissociate emotion identification and affect sharing in order to explain variance 198 
in the empathic response. 199 
 200 
 201 
 202 
 203 
 204 
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4  Implications for paradigms used in basic and clinical studies of 205 
empathy 206 
 We have argued that it is necessary to distinguish between emotion identification and 207 
affect sharing in order to characterise individual differences in the empathic response, unless 208 
empathy is redefined as affect sharing. However, whether one retains the existing definition of 209 
empathy but measures differences in emotion identification and affect sharing, or adopts the 210 
new definition of empathy, the methodological implications are identical: one must obtain 211 
independent measures of emotion identification and affect sharing. This new methodological 212 
framework has important implications for the most commonly used measures of empathy, and 213 
for the interpretation of manipulations aimed at modulating empathy. Several of these are 214 
outlined below, with discussion of how methods or interpretations may need revising in light of 215 
the distinction between emotion identification and affect sharing. 216 
 217 
4.1  The Empathic Accuracy Task (EAT) 218 
 The EAT, based on work by William Ickes and others (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & 219 
Garcia, 1990; Levenson & Ruef, 1992) and subsequently used by Zaki and colleagues (Devlin, Zaki, 220 
Ong, & Gruber, 2016; Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008) is a measure in which a group of 221 
interviewees (Targets) describe an emotional experience while providing continuous ratings of 222 
how they feel. These videotaped interviews are then used as stimulus material for experimental 223 
participants (Empathizers); while watching the videos the participants are asked to provide 224 
continuous ratings of the emotional state of the interviewee. Traditionally, the data are analysed 225 
 
 
EMPATHY NEW FRAMEWORK 13 
 
by calculating the degree of correlation between the continuous ratings provided by the 226 
interviewee and those provided by experimental participants. This degree of congruence is 227 
described as a measure of empathic accuracy. However, based on the framework described 228 
above, we would suggest that any discrepancy between the ratings provided by the interviewee 229 
and the experimental participant might be better characterized as an error in emotion 230 
identification. We can see from Figure 1 that Individual D would be described as having perfect 231 
empathic accuracy on this measure, even though they lack any empathic response to the state 232 
of the other. Accordingly, a valuable addition to this task, and, as will become apparent, to all 233 
empathy tasks, would be to require participants to provide two sets of ratings: the first, as used 234 
in the existing version of this task, indicating how they think the interviewee feels; and the second 235 
indicating how they themselves feel. When these two sets of ratings are obtained, the 236 
participant's judgement as to the state of the interviewee and the interviewee’s report of their 237 
own state can be compared to obtain a measure of the accuracy of emotion identification, 238 
whereas the participant’s judgement of the interviewee’s state and the participant’s report of 239 
their own state can be compared to derive a measure of affect sharing (as described in Figure 2). 240 
Ideally, steps should be taken to avoid these ratings influencing each other. For example, the 241 
ratings could be obtained during separate experimental sessions in a counterbalanced order.  242 
 243 
4.2  ‘Implicit empathy’ paradigms 244 
 First utilized by Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety (2005), these paradigms involve the 245 
participant being presented with images of bodies in either painful or non-painful situations. The 246 
neural activity elicited by the painful images is compared with that elicited by the non-painful 247 
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images in order to obtain a neural signature of empathy-related brain activity. This activity can 248 
then be compared across individuals or groups. A behavioural variant of this procedure was used 249 
by Gu and collaborators (Gu et al., 2010) in which participants were asked to perform an 250 
incidental task (e.g. determining whether images were of a left or a right hand) with the same 251 
painful and non-painful images of body parts. Reaction times on the incidental task were 252 
compared for painful and non-painful images on the assumption that images of others in pain 253 
would interfere with performance on the incidental task due to the empathic distress they evoke, 254 
and that therefore the degree of interference (in terms of reaction time) is an index of empathy.  255 
As noted above, however, with these paradigms it is not clear how much of the variance 256 
in the empathic response (whether behavioural or neural) is due to variance in emotion 257 
identification, and how much to affect sharing. In the original study by Jackson et al. (2005), there 258 
was a strong correlation between the intensity of pain identified in the other and activation in 259 
the mid cingulate cortex, an area often, but not always, associated with empathy (see Lamm, 260 
Decety, & Singer, 2011 for a meta-analysis). Although pain intensity ratings might be influenced 261 
by both emotion identification and the empathic response, it is likely the case that a substantial 262 
proportion of the variation in the empathic brain response is due to variation in emotion 263 
identification. Therefore, when these paradigms are used to compare the effect of experimental 264 
manipulations or group membership, effects on the degree of pain identified in the other should 265 
be measured and taken into account in the analysis of any effect on the empathic response - if 266 
changes in identified pain fully explain changes in the empathic response then the effect can be 267 
attributed to emotion identification, whereas if an effect persists after accounting for variance in 268 
emotion identification then one can be more confident in attributing any effect to affect sharing. 269 
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For example, Decety and collaborators (Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010) showed 270 
that physicians had a decreased neural response when observing pain in others. As in Jackson 271 
and collaborators’ study, the neural response was correlated with pain intensity ratings, which 272 
were lower in the group of physicians. Therefore, it is possible that the difference in the neural 273 
response in physicians is solely due to differences in pain identification – indeed, the 274 
underestimation of the intensity of patients’ pain in physicians is well-documented (see Prkachin, 275 
Solomon, & Ross, 2007 for a review). If this is the case, then matching the stimuli presented on 276 
the degree of pain identified by each group should lead to typical empathic responses in 277 
physicians. 278 
 279 
4.3  ‘Shared Network’ imaging studies with a fixed stimulus 280 
One of the first neuroimaging studies of empathy was performed by (Singer et al., 2004). 281 
This study is of particular interest as participants were only shown one of four coloured arrows. 282 
Each arrow signalled that either the participant or their experimental partner would receive a 283 
painful or a non-painful electric shock (each arrow signalled one of the four possibilities). 284 
Crucially, before the experiment, both the participant and the partner underwent a pain 285 
thresholding procedure so that all participants received a shock calibrated to produce a fixed 286 
percentage of the maximum pain they could tolerate. Thus, in principle, receipt of the painful 287 
shock had the same subjective value for the participant and their partner. Following this 288 
procedure, the degree of empathic brain activity elicited by the partner’s painful shocks in areas 289 
of the brain responding when participants received pain themselves served as a neural index of 290 
empathy. Despite only measuring the empathic response, the use of this paradigm is less 291 
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susceptible to interference from variance in emotion identification as, at least in principle, the 292 
degree of pain is fixed for all participants. While a manipulation check could have been used to 293 
ensure that there wasn't variance in the extent to which participants judged their partner to have 294 
habituated to the shock, or the extent to which their partner may have experienced increasing 295 
pain summation with repeated shocks, the use of a clearly defined and unchanging Target pain 296 
intensity is of value here. The implication is that any variance in the neural empathic brain 297 
response is attributable to affect sharing rather than emotion identification.  298 
A variant of this procedure was used in two of our (M.R., G.S. and C.L.) recent studies 299 
(Rütgen, Seidel, Riečanský, & Lamm, 2015; Rütgen, Seidel, Silani, et al., 2015). These experiments 300 
were designed to investigate the effect of reduced self-pain on the response to the pain of others. 301 
The participant’s own pain was reduced with use of a placebo analgesia procedure in which the 302 
participants were given an inert pill and informed that it would reduce their pain. In common 303 
with previous demonstrations of placebo analgesia this manipulation was successful; electric 304 
shocks were perceived as less painful than prior to the manipulation. The Singer and colleagues 305 
paradigm described above was then administered, with the addition of a photograph of the 306 
partner’s pained facial expression when they received a shock. Crucially, participants were asked 307 
to judge the degree of pain experienced by the partner when the partner received a shock, and 308 
also how bad the partner’s shock made the participant feel. Although not the focus of either 309 
paper, the fact that participants were asked to report their estimate of their partner’s pain, and 310 
the degree of affective response evoked in themselves, enable the independent effects of the 311 
intervention on emotion identification and affect sharing to be established.  312 
The results obtained by Rütgen and colleagues show that the placebo analgesia 313 
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manipulation reduced self-reported empathic responses (i.e., “How unpleasant did it feel when 314 
the other person was stimulated?”), but also reduced the intensity of the pain perceived in the 315 
partner (i.e. “How painful was this stimulus for the other person?”). Since the decrease in the 316 
participant’s empathic response was similar to the reduction in the intensity of the pain perceived 317 
in their partner, it is therefore possible that the effect of the placebo analgesia manipulation on 318 
the empathic response is solely a product of the reduction in the intensity of the perceived pain 319 
(i.e. an effect on emotion identification), and not explained by an effect on affect sharing. This 320 
was supported by the results of a mediation analysis on the original behavioural data from the 321 
102 participants reported in the Rütgen, Seidel, Silani, et al. (2015) study. The results obtained 322 
(Figure 4B) show that the effect of the placebo analgesia manipulation on the empathic response 323 
(ratings of how unpleasant it was for the self when the other received pain) was fully mediated 324 
by the intensity of the pain attributed to the partner (intensity of other-pain ratings). Indeed, a 325 
significant indirect effect (ab = 0.46, bootstrap 95% confidence interval: 0.11-0.79) explained 93% 326 
of the effect of the placebo manipulation on the empathic response. These data thus suggest 327 
that the effect of the placebo analgesia manipulation was on emotion identification and not 328 
affect sharing.  329 
These data also allow an alternative model to be tested; that there is a feedback effect of 330 
the empathic response on emotion identification. Note that emotion identification would still 331 
contribute unique variance to the empathic response – the state identified in the Target would 332 
determine, in part, the empathic response elicited in the Empathizer, and therefore would 333 
constrain the degree of empathic response available to modulate emotion identification. The 334 
feedback model can be tested using the data of Rütgen, Seidel, Silani, et al., (2015) by assessing 335 
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the mediating effect of the empathic response on the relationship between the placebo 336 
manipulation and emotion identification (Figure 4C). This analysis showed that the indirect effect 337 
in the mediation model did not reach significance (indirect effect ab = 0.30; bootstrap 95% 338 
confidence interval: -0.02-0.66), and that although the empathic response explained 54% of the 339 
placebo effect on emotion identification (compared to 93% of the effect explained by the 340 
emotion identification mediation model), the placebo manipulation was still a significant 341 
predictor of emotion identification after the empathic response was taken into account (path c’, 342 
p = 0.035, one-tailed). It should be noted, though, that the two types of ratings were not 343 
counterbalanced; other pain estimates were always collected before ratings of the empathic 344 
response. These results should therefore be interpreted with caution due to the possible 345 
presence of an order effect. While these findings do not therefore necessarily imply that placebo 346 
analgesia always exerts its effects on empathy by influencing emotion identification alone, they 347 
are used here to illustrate the importance of considering emotion identification and affect 348 
sharing as processes that can vary independently. 349 
The inclusion of measures of both empathic response and emotion identification is a 350 
useful feature of the Rütgen and collaborators studies. Other studies aiming at manipulating 351 
empathy did not follow this procedure and therefore cannot distinguish between changes in 352 
emotion identification and affect sharing. For example, recent neurostimulation studies 353 
(including one from our group (M.-P.C.)) have interpreted changes in intensity ratings of others’ 354 
pain following transcranial direct current stimulation to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Wang, 355 
Wang, Hu, & Li, 2014) or the temporoparietal junction (Coll, Tremblay, & Jackson, 2017) as 356 
changes in empathic responses. However, in both of these cases, since empathic responses were 357 
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not measured, it could be the case that the stimulation only altered the participants’ emotion 358 
identification.  359 
This brief review of empathy paradigms and empathy modulation studies further 360 
illustrates that changes in affect sharing should be measured as changes in the relationship 361 
between the intensity of the emotion attributed to the Target and the degree of the empathic 362 
response to the Target’s state (Figure 3). Alternatively, a mediation model may be used in order 363 
to determine whether emotion identification mediates the effect of any intervention on the 364 
empathic response: If emotion identification fully mediates any effect on the empathic response 365 
then it is likely that affect sharing is not affected. The important implication of this empirical 366 
framework is that we should no longer talk of modulations of empathy, rather we should 367 
distinguish between modulation of emotion identification and affect sharing (or, as mentioned 368 
above, redefine empathy as affect sharing). A claim that a manipulation affects affect sharing 369 
should be accompanied by a demonstration that any modulation of the empathic response is 370 
independent of (or at least not fully explained by) altered emotion identification. This can be 371 
achieved by measuring and taking into account emotion identification when testing empathic 372 
responses, or by individually calibrating the stimuli used to ensure that all participants attribute 373 
the same degree of emotion to the Target. Future studies should also further assess the typical 374 
relationship between emotion identification and affect sharing across the population and the 375 
factors that can influence this relationship. 376 
 377 
5  Affect sharing and emotion identification in clinical conditions  378 
 Due to its crucial role in social interaction, there has long been an interest in assessing 379 
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empathy in clinical conditions thought to be characterized by impaired social functioning. In 380 
recent years this has led to the frequent use of the paradigms discussed above, and other 381 
approaches, to measure empathic responses in clinical populations. While it is beyond the scope 382 
of this paper to describe how emotion identification could explain many findings suggesting 383 
altered empathy in clinical populations, the distinction between emotion identification and affect 384 
sharing has important implications for future clinical research on empathy. For example, there is 385 
accumulating evidence that levels of alexithymia, a sub-clinical condition associated with 386 
problems in identifying one’s own emotions (Nemiah, Freyberger, Sifneos, & Others, 1976), can 387 
explain the poor ability to identify the emotion of others which is observed in several psychiatric 388 
disorders (Bird & Cook, 2013; Brewer, Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 2015; Cook, Brewer, Shah, 389 
& Bird, 2013; Heaton et al., 2012; Keysers & Gazzola, 2014; Lamm et al., 2016). Therefore, the 390 
investigation of empathic responses within these clinical groups should describe potential 391 
differences in empathy in relation to the ability to identify one’s own emotional states and the 392 
emotional states of others. Adequately characterizing each of these abilities and their interaction 393 
will help improve future research and psychological treatments. This is especially important as it 394 
is likely that deficits in emotion identification will require different therapeutic interventions than 395 
those designed to increase affect sharing, even though both interventions may result in an 396 
increased empathic response. With respect to a condition such as psychopathy, for example, we 397 
have previously argued that psychopaths may have impaired emotion identification, and this is, 398 
in part, why they do not develop typical affect sharing. Investigating emotion identification and 399 
affect sharing longitudinally in young children with psychopathic traits would help confirm 400 
whether this proposition is correct. In contrast, those with Autism Spectrum Disorder may have 401 
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intact affect sharing and emotion identification when contextual and social inferences are not 402 
necessary (Bird & Viding, 2014; Fan et al., 2013; Hadjikani et al., 2014; Lockwood, Bird, Bridge & 403 
Viding, 2013; Tell & Davidson, 2014  ). 404 
 405 
6  Further considerations 406 
Although we have argued for the independence of emotion identification and affect 407 
sharing, it is clear that this is an oversimplification of the complete empathic process (see Bird & 408 
Viding, 2014 for a more comprehensive attempt to identify all the processes involved in 409 
generating an empathic response). There are many processes that may impact on the empathic 410 
response, and on emotion identification, that are not addressed here (these include action 411 
perception, theory of mind, and interoception) and all may make the relationship between 412 
emotion identification, affect sharing, and the empathic response difficult to observe in 413 
experimental settings if they do not include the means to experimentally or statistically account 414 
for variance in these additional processes. It should also be recognized that the empathic 415 
response is the result of a dynamic process which unfolds over time, with the possibility of 416 
recurrent processing and feedback from later processing stages to earlier processing stages. 417 
Rather than negate the necessity of dissociating emotion identification and affect sharing, 418 
considerations such as these highlight that the ultimate aim should be to produce a dynamic 419 
model of all processes that contribute to the empathic response in order to gain a complete 420 
picture of an individual’s or group’s socio-affective ability, or to understand the impact of an 421 
intervention which modulates the empathic response. 422 
It should also be noted that we have not addressed the distinction which is sometimes 423 
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made in the literature between empathy and emotion contagion (e.g. de Vignemont & Singer, 424 
2006; de Waal, 1996; see also Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). This distinction is typically 425 
drawn on the basis of self-other distinction; for example de Waal (1996) defines emotional 426 
contagion as “total identification without discrimination between one’s feelings and those of the 427 
others (p. 80)” whereas empathy occurs when “the other is recognized not just as an extension 428 
of the self, but as a separate entity (p. 69)”. Singer & de Vignemont (2006) go further, stating that 429 
empathy is distinguished from emotion contagion when the Empathiser realises that their state 430 
has been caused by the state of the Target. The distinction between emotion contagion and 431 
empathy is clearly important for the phenomenology of the empathic experience; and influences 432 
whether the Empathiser feels a state of personal distress due to a lack of self-other distinction 433 
between their state and the negative state of the Target, or a state of empathic concern (Nancy 434 
Eisenberg & Sulik, 2012). It also likely influences the likelihood and type of behaviour in response 435 
to another’s state - personal distress may prompt a withdrawal response from the Target, 436 
whereas empathic concern is more likely to prompt prosocial helping behaviour (Batson, Fultz, & 437 
Schoenrade, 1987; de Waal, 2008; Eisenberg, Hofer, & Vaughan, 2007). However, this distinction 438 
has less relevance for the framework presented above. As previously noted, emotion 439 
identification may involve a conscious recognition of the state of the Target or not. If emotion 440 
identification is accurate but not conscious, and the affect sharing system is intact, then emotion 441 
contagion (as defined by de Waal, 1996) will result. If emotion identification is accurate and 442 
conscious, and the affect sharing system is intact, then the Empathiser will be in the same state 443 
as the Target (meeting the standard definition of empathy) and will have a conscious 444 
representation of the Target’s state. It is an open question as to the factors that determine 445 
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whether the Empathizer then engages in self-other distinction (Bird & Viding, 2014; de Waal, 446 
2008), or realizes that their state has been caused by that of the Target (de Vignemont & Singer, 447 
2006).  448 
Finally, the main focus of this text has been on empathy in humans and we have not 449 
addressed the implications of this new framework for non-human animal studies, which can 450 
provide an important contribution to the understanding of the cognitive and affective processes 451 
underlying empathy (de Waal & Preston, 2017; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2013). Since it has been 452 
previously argued that empathy is supported by similar processes in nonhuman mammals 453 
(Meyza, Bartal, Monfils, Panksepp, & Knapska, 2017; Panksepp & Lahvis, 2011), it would be 454 
interesting for future studies to also attempt to measure and dissociate processes akin to 455 
emotion identification and affect sharing in non-human animals. 456 
7  Conclusion 457 
The fact that emotion identification and affect sharing are often confounded in 458 
experimental paradigms, or used as interchangeable terms, or described as ‘empathy’ reflects 459 
both the paucity of information processing models of socio-cognitive processes and the lack of a 460 
common lexicon in the social cognition literature (Happé et al., 2017). These processes may be 461 
interrelated, but they need to be considered independently to understand the mechanisms 462 
underlying individual differences in empathic responses, and to identify the locus of any 463 
modulation of empathic response in clinical populations or due to psychological or 464 
pharmacological interventions. Adequately characterizing each of these mechanisms and their 465 
interaction will help improve future cognitive neuroscience research and psychological 466 
treatments. Furthermore, and equally important, consideration of the differential impact of 467 
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impaired emotion recognition and affect sharing leads us to offer a novel empirical framework 468 
to measure empathy, and to describe variance in empathic responses. Whether this aim would 469 
be better served by redefining empathy as affect sharing - as the degree to which the 470 
Empathizer’s own state matches that identified in the Target - is an open question. Nevertheless, 471 
the resolution of this issue does not negate the requirement to measure emotion identification 472 
and affect sharing independently in any study of empathy, and so we recommend the use of the 473 
measurement framework described here. 474 
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Figure 1. Theoretical graphs illustrating the relationship between the emotion 634 
experienced by the Target and the emotion identified by the Empathizer (top panel), the 635 
relationship between the Empathizer’s empathic response and the emotion experienced by the 636 
Target (middle panel) and the relationship between the same empathic response and the degree 637 
of emotion identified in the Target by the Empathizer (bottom panel) for four different 638 
individuals. Individual A shows perfectly accurate emotion identification (top panel) and a degree 639 
of affect sharing which could be described using the equation for a straight line in the following 640 
manner [Emotion Elicited = 1 x Emotion Identified + 0], producing an empathic response that is 641 
perfectly concordant with the emotion they identify in the Target (bottom panel). They also meet 642 
the standard definition of empathy as they are in the same state as the Target (middle panel). 643 
Individuals B and C have less accurate emotion identification ability (top panel), tending to 644 
overestimate or underestimate the intensity of the Target’s emotional state, respectively. 645 
However, they both show an empathic response which is concordant with the emotion they 646 
identify in the Target (bottom panel), and so would be judged to have the same degree of affect 647 
sharing, described using the same equation, as Individual A. Note that Individuals B and C would 648 
not meet the standard definition of empathy as their state does not match that of the Target 649 
(middle panel). Individual D is excellent at identifying the state of the Target (top panel). 650 
However, this individual’s degree of affect sharing is significantly less than that of Individuals A, 651 
B and C – the slope of the line describing their empathic response in response in response to 652 
emotion identified in the Target is significantly less than that of the other individuals Emotion 653 
Elicited = 0.1 x Emotion Identified + 0] (bottom panel). This individual would also not meet the 654 
standard definition of empathy as their state does not match that of the Target (middle panel), 655 
but the source of their lack of empathy is very different to that of Individuals B and C. 656 
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 679 
 680 
 681 
Figure 2. Graphs illustrating the relationship between the intensity of the empathic 682 
response elicited in the Empathizer as a function of the intensity of the emotional state identified 683 
in the Target. We characterise this relationship as affect sharing, and three measures may be of 684 
interest: 1) the intensity of Target emotion at which the Empathizer’s empathic response is non-685 
zero, 2) the slope of the function (indicating the degree to which changes in the Target’s state 686 
prompt changes in the Empathizer’s state), and 3) the shape of the function (of particular interest 687 
would be an exponential function which may indicate a dynamic interaction between empathy 688 
and emotion attribution at higher intensities of Target emotion). 689 
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 707 
 708 
Figure 3. Hypothetical illustrations of the relationship between emotion identification, 709 
affect sharing and the empathic response. A manipulation leading to a decrease in emotion 710 
identification with a corresponding decrease in the empathic response is a sign of an absence of 711 
a change in affect sharing (A and B). The hypothetical manipulation illustrated in C and D 712 
illustrates a decrease in emotion identification, together with a greater decrease in empathic 713 
response, indicating a decrease in emotion identification and affect sharing.  714 
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 719 
  720 
  Figure 4. Three possible models of the relationships between the placebo analgesia 721 
manipulation, empathic response and emotion identification as reported in Rütgen et al. (2015). 722 
In A, both empathic response and emotion identification are independently influenced by the 723 
placebo analgesia manipulation. A mediation analysis of the Rütgen et al. data did not support 724 
this model, instead, as presented in B, the data demonstrate that the change in empathic 725 
response was fully mediated by changes in emotion identification. C shows that the empathic 726 
response also explains some, but not all, of the variance of the experimental effect on emotion 727 
identification. *p < 0.05, one-tailed. 728 
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